

# PROMOTING CLIMATE-RESILIENT PEACEBUILDING IN FRAGILE STATES



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## **Promoting Climate-Resilient Peacebuilding in Fragile States**

### **March 2015**

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## ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
CDC	Conservation Development Centre
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
IDPS	International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
PSG	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UN PBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

An increasing share of the world's vulnerable population lives in fragile and conflict-affected states. While great progress has been made in recent years to eradicate poverty and vulnerability on a global scale, this progress has been largely absent in those countries plagued by weak governance, political and economic instability, and the threat or reality of daily violence. In countries like Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan, national governments are unable or unwilling to provide safety, security, and access to basic services to the majority of their citizens, many of whom continue to struggle to feed their families and plan for a better future.

There has been significant progress since the early 1990s in understanding how the development community can most effectively engage in conflict-affected and fragile states and advance peacebuilding processes (Matthew & Hammill, 2012). Despite this progress, efforts to help fragile states move onto a path toward stability and sustainability continue to face enormous challenges. Climate change is one of these challenges. With the scientific community painting an increasingly dire picture of its potential scope and speed, climate change and variability could undermine, and even reverse, much of the development and peacebuilding progress that has been made in fragile states. Many now see climate change and its impacts on the environment and natural resources as a challenge to human security and a potential driver of conflict.

Changing climatic conditions have the potential to act as what UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon calls a "threat multiplier," interacting with existing conflict drivers such as political and economic instability, wealth disparities, poverty, weak governance, human right abuses, and historical grievances to exacerbate existing conflicts or trigger new ones (United Nations General Assembly, 2009). By itself, climate change is unlikely to be the sole, direct cause of tensions or conflict; it is expected to be a contributing, rather than determining, factor in future tensions in fragile states (Brown & Crawford, 2009).

Fragile states, despite being among the least responsible for global climate change, are typically acknowledged as among the places where climate-related conflicts are most likely to emerge. This is true for a number of reasons: their

high exposure to climate risks, their economic reliance on climate-dependent sectors (particularly rain-fed agriculture), and their histories of conflict, poverty and weak governance, which all serve to increase vulnerability to climate change (Brown & Crawford, 2009).

While remaining grounded in good development practices and processes, interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states therefore increasingly need to strive to simultaneously achieve peacebuilding and climate resilience objectives through:

- *Climate-resilient peacebuilding* interventions that take into consideration the implications of near- and long-term climate risk as a contributing factor in driving conflict.
- *Conflict-sensitive climate change* responses designed to ensure that, at a minimum, interventions do not increase the risk of conflict and, preferably, serve to enhance peacebuilding opportunities.

Drawing on desk-based research, practitioner surveys and interviews, as well as discussions at a practitioner workshop held in Nairobi in January 2015, this paper seeks to provide some initial guidance on how this may be achieved. It focuses on the integration of climate resilience into peacebuilding interventions—while conflict-sensitizing climate change programming is equally important, a number of resources already exist on the topic (see, for example, the Conflict-Sensitivity Resource Pack<sup>1</sup>). Section 2 of the paper explores some of the challenges of engaging in fragile states, as well as providing a brief review of some of the guidance and approaches available for peacebuilding practitioners working in such contexts. Section 3 examines the links between climate change and instability and conflict in fragile states, and presents arguments for an integrated approach to addressing climate and peacebuilding challenges. Section 4 outlines entry points for achieving this integration, as well as some of the common challenges faced by practitioners. Section 5 concludes the paper. An annex at the end of the paper presents a review of a non-exhaustive selection of peacebuilding toolkits, guidance notes and frameworks, and identifies some of the ways in which climate resilience could be integrated into these existing resources.

<sup>1</sup> The Resource Pack can be accessed at <http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/topic/topic/resource-pack>.

## 2.0 ENGAGING IN FRAGILE STATES

This section describes the operating context in fragile states and the challenges associated with peacebuilding and development interventions in these contexts. It provides an overview of the international guidance that has been developed for actors engaging with fragile states, followed by an introduction to practical approaches for peacebuilding.

### 2.1 CAUSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FRAGILITY

An estimated 1.5 billion people live in conflict-affected and fragile states (New Deal, n.d.). While there is no internationally agreed upon definition for what constitutes a fragile state, within these countries governments are typically incapable of assuring basic security to their citizens, cannot maintain the rule of law and justice, and are unable to provide basic services and economic opportunities for their population (Mcloughlin, 2012). It is within these countries that the world's poor are increasingly concentrated, and given current development trajectories, it is unlikely that any fragile state will achieve the Millennium Development Goals by the end of 2015. As noted by University of Oxford Professor Paul Collier, these countries are “falling behind and falling apart” (Collier, 2007).

The causes of fragility are multidimensional and context-specific. The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre divides factors driving fragility into four main categories: structural and economic factors (poverty, economic decline, violent conflict, geography, demographic stresses, and competition for natural resources); political and institutional factors (weak governance and institutions, repression of political freedoms, unstable political transitions); social factors (horizontal and gender inequalities, social exclusion, weak civil society); and international factors (legacies of colonialism, international political economy, global economic shocks, sanctions) (Mcloughlin, 2012). Similarly, the Fund for Peace, which publishes the annual Fragile States Index, measures fragility using 12 social, economic and political indicators: demographic pressures, the presence of refugees and internally displaced persons, group grievances, human flight and brain drain, uneven economic development, poverty and economic decline, state legitimacy, the provision of public services, the respect of human rights and rule of law, the security apparatus, the presence of factionalized elites, and the intervention of external actors.<sup>2</sup> These causes and characteristics of state fragility are often described as mutually and self-reinforcing; as a result, fragile states are frequently at risk of being caught in negative cycles of perpetual poverty and instability. This complex operating context presents a number of challenges for practitioners and policy-makers.

<sup>2</sup> For the 2014 Fragile States Index, the five countries listed as “very high alert,” from first to fifth, were: South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan.

### 2.2 THE CHALLENGES OF WORKING IN FRAGILE STATES

Since the mid-2000s, the international community has significantly increased its focus on supporting development within fragile and conflict-affected states: today, 37 per cent of all official development assistance is spent within these countries (New Deal, 2014). This significant amount of funding reflects a recognition by the international community that donor priorities—which since the 1990s had placed an emphasis on providing development assistance to those developing countries able to demonstrate good governance and stable macroeconomic policies—were resulting in inadequate aid to fragile states. Between 1992 and 2002, for example, the World Bank estimates that difficult partnership countries “received approximately 43% less in total aid than would have been predicted by their population, poverty level, and policy and institutional environment” (Levin & Dollar, 2005). Consequently, poverty and fragility have remained high within these countries, undermining efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and potentially encouraging instability and violence within and outside of their borders (Department for International Development [DFID], 2005).



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Donor agencies have acknowledged that working in fragile and conflict-affected states is difficult, costly and risky (DFID, 2005). The challenges of engaging with fragile states are complex and numerous: safety concerns for staff and partners; weakened governance frameworks and national institutions; population movements and capacity flight (sometimes on a massive scale); rapid changes in operating context; damaged or destroyed infrastructure; group tensions and widespread distrust; severe economic decline or collapse; threats of violence; rampant corruption and a lack of transparency and accountability; the deterioration of public services; violations of human rights; and the absence of the rule of law. Within these contexts, there is a dearth of reliable information, records and documentation upon which to base policies, and it can be difficult to establish baselines and indicators in order to measure the impact and progress of programming. It can also be difficult to connect early warning systems to appropriate response mechanisms. Donors and international organization report that they often have trouble finding capable local partners, both within government and civil society. Finally, fragile countries themselves often have minimal capacities to absorb development assistance. These challenges will only amplify the impacts of climate change on state, community and individual vulnerability, and complicate the design and delivery of response strategies.

### 2.3 PEACEBUILDING APPROACHES

Most conventional development tools and approaches are not well-suited for use in fragile settings, and special practices need to be adopted. Peacebuilding is one of the primary ways in which the international community engages with fragile states. Understanding of the concept of “peacebuilding” has progressively evolved since the 1970s, when the term was first used in relation to efforts to address the root causes of violent conflict and promote conflict resolution (UN Peacebuilding Support Office [PBSO], n.d.). Today, peacebuilding is understood as a complex, long-term process that aims to solidify peace and avoid a lapse or relapse into conflict by strengthening a state’s capacity to manage conflicts at all levels, effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions, and lay the foundations for sustainable development (UN PBSO, n.d.; UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). For peacebuilding strategies to be effective, it is recognized that they need to be carefully planned, coherent, focused, tailored to the needs of a particular context and based on national ownership. Peacebuilding processes should also involve multiple stakeholders, including civil society, local actors and government (despite possible corruption problems), in order to build capacity, foster ownership and ensure the durability of any changes to the brickwork of a society (UN PBSO, 2013).

In 2009 the UN Secretary-General outlined five areas that have emerged as priorities for the United Nations in the

immediate aftermath of conflict. In these fragile contexts, support is needed for:

- *Basic safety and security* for the population and the strengthening of rule of law.
- *Political processes*, including electoral process, inclusive dialogue, reconciliation and conflict management capacities.
- *Provision of basic services*, such as education, health, and water and sanitation, as well as the return and reintegration of displaced populations.
- *Restoring core government functions*, including administration and finance, at national and subnational levels.
- *Economic revitalization*, in terms of employment opportunities, livelihoods and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

Alongside the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations and the New Deal for Peacebuilding (see Annex 1), these five dimensions represent a framework for action on peacebuilding in fragile states, spanning development, peace and security, and human rights interventions. While the relative importance and appropriate sequencing of actions within these different dimensions will depend on the context, capacity building for national actors across all of the areas is an urgent priority. Flexibility and attention to gender dynamics are also critical for effectiveness and sustainability of results (UN General Assembly, 2009).

To help put this framework into action, a number of general and sector-specific guidelines, frameworks and toolkits for peacebuilding interventions have been developed in recent years, including (to name just a few) the World Bank’s Guidance for Supporting State-Building in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (2012), the UNDG-ECHA guidance note on Natural Resource Management in Transition Settings (2013), and a number of donor-specific conflict analysis frameworks. For descriptions of these and a sample of other guidance notes, frameworks and toolkits, please see Annex 2.

Reviewing these resources, common lessons emerge. Broadly speaking, the guidance emphasizes the need to improve and strengthen participation, accountability and transparency when working in fragile and conflict-affected states (Booth, 2011; Kelsall, 2008). Specifically, when working in peacebuilding contexts, there is a need for:

- *Interventions to be based on a strong understanding of the context.* For interventions in fragile states to be successful it is critical to first understand why they function differently and why, for example, they have difficulties in absorbing aid effectively (Hamza & Corendea, 2012). Context-

appropriate project and program design and implementation can be strengthened through application of political economy analysis, which can provide insight into existing power relations, historical grievances, the interests and incentives of different individuals, groups and institutions, how resources are distributed and contested, and how relationships transform over time (DFID, 2009; Hamza & Corendea, 2012). This approach is particularly useful in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where challenges can be deeply political (DFID, 2009). Context analysis can also be extended beyond national borders to the wider region; broader regional peace and conflict dynamics may be an important factor when considering a nation's fragility.

- *Work within government systems and priorities to advance ownership and capacity over the long term.* Many fragile governments lack capacity, accountability, transparency or the will to contribute to peacebuilding and adaptation to climate change. Despite these limitations, academic and policy circles increasingly accept the need to build on a fragile state's existing institutions (Booth, 2011; Devarajan, Khemani & Walton, 2011). Peacebuilding should be a country-led and country-driven process; national development priorities and strategies should be set by national governments and used to guide peacebuilding and development programming. Although there are inherent risks to working with corrupt entities, working within existing government institutions is expected to lead to better long-term results by increasing domestic ownership of processes and measures, building capacity and familiarity, and slowly increasing accountability (Booth, 2011; Kelsall, 2008; Paavola, 2003; Vivekananda, 2011). To do otherwise risks creating "para-state systems run by NGOs" (Vivekananda, 2011, p. 16).
- *Focus on what can be done rather than what should be done.* It is important to focus on what can be done by fragile states using existing capacities and fostering needed ones,

rather than what should be done (Hamza & Corendea, 2012; ODI, 2013). A fragile state, for example, may not be able to achieve the ambitious targets of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; it may be better to focus on what they can achieve, with international support, by that deadline, making incremental progress toward the desired outcomes.

- *Improved financial flows to fragile states.* Development assistance provided by donor countries needs to be less fragmented, more predictable, and disbursed in a manner that is more sensitive and informed by the local political and economic context, and less driven by donor priorities. Long-term and predictable aid commitments are needed to finance and plan for long-term commitments such as building roads, schools, and health centres that form the basis for sustained progress in meeting basic needs (Booth, 2011; Hamza & Corendea, 2012; International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding [IDPS], 2011; OECD, 2013).
- *Transparent and participatory processes.* Engaging communities in assessing problems, identifying priorities and developing solutions can strengthen the development, adaptation and peacebuilding processes at the local level as well as inform national planning processes, foster participation and increase the legitimacy of government structures. Participatory processes that link top-down, state-led priorities with bottom-up, community-based approaches are widely recognized as key to increasing the resilience of fragile states (Hamza & Corendea, 2012; Yande & Bronkhorst, 2011; Tänzler, Mohs & Ziegenhagen, 2013; Vivekananda, 2010; 2011).

These lessons could equally apply to efforts to respond to climate change, in developing countries in general and fragile states in particular. The links between climate change and peacebuilding in fragile states are the focus of the next section.



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## 3.0 CLIMATE CHANGE AND FRAGILE STATES

In this section, the links between conflict and climate change are discussed. It builds on this discussion to present the case for an integrated approach to climate-resilient peacebuilding.

### 3.1 LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT

The implications of climate change for peace and security have been the subject of significant debate in recent years. While various theories have tried to determine the causal links between climate change and security, no one explanation has captured the complexity of the relationship. What has instead emerged from the research is an understanding that climate change can be a contributor—at times subtle, at times significant—to the causal network that generates conflict and threatens human security.

There is growing consensus that climate change will not directly lead to conflict but, as previously mentioned, will act as a “threat multiplier,” exacerbating existing challenges and sources of tension such as weak governance, poverty, historical grievances and ethnic differences. It could contribute to the causes of conflict in a number of ways, including by (Brown & Crawford 2009; Smith & Vivekananda, 2007; Tänzler, Maas & Carius, 2010; UN General Assembly, 2009; United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2009; Yande & Bronkhorst, 2011):

- *Increasing competition for natural resources.* The management (or mismanagement) of natural resources has long been a source of conflict within and between countries.<sup>3</sup> Climate change could increase this established risk by intensifying the scarcity of resources critical to livelihoods (e.g., by worsening water and food shortages), and by opening up access to new resources (e.g., oil and gas in the Arctic).
- *Displacing large numbers of people.* Rising sea levels, more frequent and intense extreme weather events, declining rainfall in already arid locations and other factors could result in significant movement of people within and between states, leading to resource competition between host and migrant populations.
- *Overwhelming state institutions by placing additional stress on social, economic and natural systems.* By placing additional stress on health, water, food and energy systems, climate change will threaten the already weak governance structures of fragile states and could further impede their capacity to perform their basic functions. This could

weaken the social contract between governments and their citizens, creating fertile ground for the emergence of political instability, unrest and conflict (Matthew & Hammill, 2012; USAID, 2009; UN General Assembly, 2009; Barnett & Adger, 2007).

In fragile and conflict-affected states there is greater potential for climate change to cause instability and increase the risk of insecurity or unrest emerging (GSDC, 2013; USAID, 2009). Fragile states are particularly at risk due to the limited capacities of their governments and institutions, their reliance on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, and their location in regions where the worst climate impacts are anticipated, such as the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, south Asia and the Middle East. In a context of limited government response capacities, weak rule of law, corruption and generally vulnerable socioeconomic systems, the additional stress of climate change may strain the capacity of households, communities and governments to cope and respond to impacts (Barnett & Adger, 2007; UN General Assembly, 2009). There is also the risk of negative feedback loops emerging, where existing conflicts restrict the capacity of communities or a state to effectively respond to climate change, amplifying the impacts of a changing climate, and in turn potentially exacerbating the conflict itself, further reducing the ability of communities and states to adapt (USAID, 2009; Yande & Bronkhorst, 2011).

### 3.2 THE CASE FOR CLIMATE-RESILIENT PEACEBUILDING

Ensuring that climate change does not compromise development and peacebuilding efforts in fragile states and further destabilize fragile situations will in part be determined by whether climate change considerations are integrated into peacebuilding and development efforts, and vice versa (Matthew & Hammill, 2012). This raises questions as to how best to integrate peacebuilding, climate change adaptation and development in a synergistic manner given that the policies and strategies that drive actions in these different domains are often disconnected and divergent (Smith & Vivekananda, 2007). When each has its own established institutions, protocols, tools and approaches, coordination becomes extremely challenging (Wilson Center, 2011).

Climate change adaptation involves taking actions in response to, or in anticipation of, a changing climate in order to reduce adverse impacts or take advantage of emerging opportunities

<sup>3</sup> In a study released in 2009, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) argues that at least 40 per cent of all intrastate conflicts within the last 60 years were fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources. They further suggest that countries recovering from resource-related conflicts have twice the risk of suffering from a relapse into conflict within five years of the cessation of hostilities. While there are high profile examples of conflict emerging over the use of non-renewable, high-value natural resources like minerals, oil and gas, examples of climate-dependent resources contributing to the onset and perpetuation of violence can also be cited. For example, cocoa production helped finance armed groups during the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire. More prominently, conflict in the Middle East is tied to control over scarce resources like water and fertile land (UNEP, 2009).

(Tompkins & Adger, 2003). The potential for climate change adaptation action to help ensure the long-term sustainability of development interventions has been understood for more than a decade (e.g., AfDB et al., 2003). As such, support for adaptation often involves the integration of climate risk considerations into development interventions, aided by specialized tools, guidance and frameworks (see Hammill & Tanner, 2011 for a review of adaptation screening and assessment tools). More recently, attention has been given to the potential for climate change adaptation to prevent climate-related conflicts and support peacebuilding—to be a conflict “threat minimizer” by counterbalancing the additional

stress of climate change on vulnerable socioeconomic systems (Tänzler, Maas & Carius, 2010; Yande & Bronkhorst, 2011).

To realize this potential, there is a strong imperative for integrating climate change considerations in peacebuilding interventions, supporting peacebuilding processes that achieve results that are resilient to climate extremes and changes over the longer term, address climate change as a potential driver of conflict, and strengthen adaptive capacity. The following section provides some initial ideas on how this can be achieved.



Photo credit: UN Photo/Catherine Tjerina

## 4.0 ACHIEVING INTEGRATION FOR CLIMATE-RESILIENT PEACEBUILDING

This section discusses how the connections between climate change adaptation and peacebuilding can be strengthened in practice, identifying principles, entry points, challenges for practitioners, and opportunities within existing guidance for peacebuilding interventions.

### 4.1 PRINCIPLES FOR CLIMATE-RESILIENT PEACEBUILDING

Drawing from surveys, interviews, practitioner discussions and a review of existing guidelines, toolkits and approaches to engaging in fragile states, the following six principles can help guide practitioners in designing and implementing climate-resilient peacebuilding interventions:

#### 1. *Use integrated context analysis as the foundation for planning.*

A common theme in both adaptation and peacebuilding is the importance of context analysis as a basis for planning interventions. An integrated, holistic context analysis that brings together conflict dynamics and climate risks provides an excellent foundation for peacebuilding initiatives that are both conflict-sensitive and resilient to climate change. This analysis should be designed to enable a solid understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between climate change and conflict, including drivers of vulnerability and conflict, impacts of climate change and conflict on social, economic and natural systems, and actors involved in existing or potential conflicts. Understanding the climate context may also require an investment in capacity building among practitioners to ensure that they can access, understand and use relevant nationally and internationally generated climate information.

2. *Balance immediate and long-term priorities.* In fragile contexts, there exist a wide range of urgent needs, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, the settlement of internally displaced persons and refugees, and the re-establishment of basic services such as water and sanitation. These are among the immediate priorities for peacebuilding interventions. At the same time, there is a need to develop capacities, establish systems and build secure and sustainable livelihoods for sustained peace and security. Ideally, peacebuilding interventions will incorporate actions on both fronts, addressing immediate needs (taking climate risks into account) while also investing in actions that enable people and institutions to strengthen their resilience and maintain peace over the longer term.

3. *Address climate-natural resource-conflict linkages.* Climate change is already having an impact on the quality and availability of natural resources such as water and pasture. This has significant implications for rural livelihoods and exacerbates poverty, vulnerability and competition over resources—all potential drivers of conflict. Consequently,

any actor working on natural resource-related conflict issues should also be considering how these dynamics may change over time as a result of climate change and designing interventions that enable people to better manage variability and scarcity in resource availability and access.

4. *Facilitate coordination across disciplines, sectors and levels.* The impacts of both climate change and conflict cut across sectors and require intervention at multiple levels. Achieving climate-resilient peacebuilding requires the blending of expertise from the conflict community and the climate change community, as well as other relevant disciplines such as development, governance and disaster risk management. It also requires coordination across sectors to ensure that the multiple dimensions of peacebuilding and climate change adaptation are addressed, and that efforts in one sector do not undermine progress in another.

5. *Adopt a forward-looking approach to planning:* Peacebuilding actors are increasingly incorporating analysis of potential future scenarios for conflict risks as part of the process of identifying priorities and designing interventions. Combining these scenarios with climate change scenarios would enable a more forward-looking strategy that addresses changing risks, whether due to climate change or to other social or political changes. Without this perspective, there is the potential for maladaptation or exacerbation of conflict drivers.

6. *Aim for resilience as an overarching objective.* The concept of resilience provides a helpful focus for climate-resilient peacebuilding initiatives. Resilience is the ability to anticipate, cope with, recover from, and adapt to shocks and stresses. It is also understood as the ability to maintain and improve well-being despite shocks and stresses. Building resilience of systems and of people will prepare them to better manage the risks and uncertainties associated with climate change, as well as other types of shocks, thereby reducing stresses that could evolve into drivers of conflict.

### 4.2 ENTRY POINTS FOR INTEGRATED APPROACHES

In fragile states, peacebuilding objectives are most often the primary driver for development processes. As such, these represent the most logical entry point for integrating climate change. The table below suggests how climate-resilient approaches might be integrated into each of the UN Secretary-General's five peacebuilding dimensions.

As shown in the table, climate change considerations are most relevant in the basic services, government functions

and economic revitalization dimensions. Actions in these areas present clear entry points for integrating climate change. Further, particularly for actions on basic services such as water and sanitation, livelihoods and infrastructure rehabilitation,

there is a real risk that if climate change is not considered, interventions may be ineffective or unsustainable. In the worst-case scenario, they may prove maladaptive, undermining both adaptation efforts and peacebuilding progress.

Peacebuilding Dimensions	Types of Actions	Considerations for Climate-Resilient Peacebuilding
Basic Safety and Security	Mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	Integrate climate risks into natural resource-based employment and livelihoods strategies for ex-combatants Create construction jobs for ex-combatants in the climate-resilient rehabilitation of infrastructure Provide training and support to ex-combatants to build and implement climate-resilient water technologies as part of reintegration strategies
Political Processes	Electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, developing conflict management capacity	Use climate change and climate impacts as a platform for dialogue between previously conflicting groups to help establish trust and confidence and promote peace while addressing climate change Strengthen customary and statutory mechanisms for resolving climate-related disputes over natural resources
Provision of Basic Services	Water and sanitation, health, education, reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees	Design water infrastructure and water management systems that take climate change and risks into account Build the capacity of health services to respond to climate change impacts on human health, including the monitoring of climate-induced changes to the distribution of disease Integrate climate change issues into curriculum for primary and secondary education Consider exposure to current and future climate risks in the selection and establishment of sites at which to resettle internally displaced persons and refugees
Restoring Core Government Functions	Basic public administration, public finance	Develop capacities for forward-looking, scenario-based planning that takes into account climate trends and forecasts Strengthen early warning systems and associated humanitarian response mechanisms Rebuild and strengthen national hydro-meteorological services and infrastructure Develop national disaster risk reduction and management strategies
Economic Revitalization	Employment generation, livelihoods, rehabilitation of basic infrastructure	Support climate-resilient livelihoods by integrating climate risk management into livelihood support Build adaptive capacity to enable management of uncertainty and change Integrate current and future climate trends and risks into economic planning for natural resource sectors Consider climate change projections in the design and construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure, to ensure that it is climate-resilient

Sources: UN General Assembly Security Council, 2009; Matthew & Hammill, 2012; UNDG, 2010; Tyler & Moench, 2012; UNEP and UNDP, 2013.

### 4.3 CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION

While there are arguments and clear entry points for integrating climate change adaptation and peacebuilding as described above, the reality is much more complex. Even with a clear mandate, there are challenges to effectively operationalizing integrated approaches (see both positive and negative experiences with mainstreaming gender, for example). Interviews with experts and practitioners working in fragile states highlighted a number of challenges to achieving integration in practice and addressing climate change in peacebuilding contexts.

At a basic level, practitioners often cited difficulties in accessing and interpreting climate data in peacebuilding contexts. The problem is twofold. Climate data itself may not be available due to limited or destroyed local capacities to generate it: meteorological stations may have been destroyed

during the violence or fallen into disrepair; skilled climate professionals may have fled or been killed; and investments into national weather infrastructure may have dried up. When climate data is available, it may not be available at a scale that is useful for decision making. At the same time, government capacity to deal with the complexities of climate change vulnerability and risk is low, particularly in fragile states, and this extends to practitioners as well; they often do not have the skills or knowledge required to use or understand climate data and translate it into appropriate responses. Moreover, when these skills are available, they can be lost to organizations and governments with the high turnover of national and international staff.

Competing priorities in peacebuilding contexts are another ongoing challenge, making it difficult to ensure that climate change receives adequate focus but does not divert attention

and resources from other, more pressing humanitarian priorities. In fragile states, populations are also often simply trying to survive; tending to their immediate needs trumps considerations of longer-term climate risks. Within these contexts, the focus for donors and other development actors tends to be on addressing immediate needs and priorities, and on achieving concrete results to demonstrate “peace dividends.” This can present an understandable barrier to introducing forward-looking thinking and planning for climate change adaptation (and other longer-term risks and opportunities).

More than one practitioner noted that there is more funding available to respond to humanitarian emergencies than to try to prevent them. Fragile states themselves are often not prioritized for climate change action, and there are barriers for these countries in accessing specific climate change funding (for example, from the Global Environment Fund) that would enable capacity development for government and civil society actors to address climate change.

There is also a lack of collaboration and coordination among practitioners and policy-makers focused on peacebuilding, environment, climate change, humanitarian action and poverty reduction, leading to missed opportunities and programming silos. To say nothing of climate change, there are still significant challenges in linking relief and development, despite increasing focus on resilience in both communities. Part of the reason for this is practical: peacebuilding practitioners are often overstretched as it is, with limited time and capacities to address a wide range of cross-cutting issues, including gender, environment, governance, and climate change. The existence of parallel budget lines for peacebuilding, humanitarian response, climate change and long-term development works against integrated approaches, as does the lack of integration of climate change into overarching frameworks and goals for peacebuilding and development in fragile states. Without this mandate, it can be difficult to make the case for investing the time and resources required to achieve an integrated approach.

Uncertainty around future climate change is another barrier. There is a tendency to plan interventions based on specific risks, rather than to build capacity to deal with evolving risks; it is difficult to monitor and evaluate these longer-term, uncertain risks, while “easier” to demonstrate to donors results relating to shorter-term, tangible goals. Funding mechanisms typically do not allow flexibility to respond to emerging situations or changes in the context (although there is some evidence that this is changing, for example with increasing inclusion of crisis modifiers in project designs and budgets).

Despite these challenges, there is general consensus among practitioners that climate risks must be considered in peacebuilding and development interventions in fragile states in order for these efforts to be effective and sustainable.

#### 4.4 AVAILABLE GUIDANCE

There is no shortage of guidance available for analysis, program design, and monitoring and evaluation in fragile states. While some documents target specific agency processes and frameworks, there is also an abundance of more general guidance that can be adapted to different contexts and processes. These tools have been developed by and for the UN, development agencies, multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academics.

A mapping of recent guidance for programming in fragile states found three main types of documents, as shown in the table below. The list below is by no means exhaustive, but represents a sample of those toolkits, frameworks and guidance notes used by stakeholders operating in peacebuilding contexts:



Photo credit: UN Photo/Legam Abassi

Type of Guidance	Document Title	Developed By	Year
Frameworks	Conflict Assessment Framework	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	2012
Guidance Notes	Natural resource management in transition settings	UN Development Group and Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (UNDG-ECHA)	2013
	Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations	United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery	2013
	Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict: Renewable Resources and Conflict	United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action	2012
	International Support to Post-Conflict Transition	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)	2012
Toolkits	Water and Conflict Toolkit	USAID	2014
	Guidance for Supporting State- Building in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: A Tool-Kit	World Bank Group	2012
	Conflict-Sensitivity Resource Pack	The Conflict-Sensitivity Consortium <sup>4</sup>	2004

Various authors have pointed to the potential for climate change adaptation to be integrated into peacebuilding frameworks and guidance (Dabelko, Herzer, Null, Parker, & Sticklor, 2013; Tänzler, Mohns & Ziegenhagen, 2013; UNDG-ECHA, 2013). A review of the documents identified above found that some have very strong components on climate change integration (for example, the UN guidance note on renewable resources and conflict). Others have little or no recognition of climate risks (such as the Conflict-Sensitivity Resource Pack). One reason for this may simply be the timing of the document development: as climate change awareness has increased, so has attention from the conflict and peacebuilding community. As a result, more recent documents are more likely to integrate climate change issues. Please see Annex 2 for summaries of the document reviews, including identification of entry points for integrating climate change issues.

In the literature, there is general consensus around the need for practical guidance for policy-makers and development practitioners on how to respond to the challenge posed by climate change in fragile contexts (IDS, 2010; Barnett & Adgers, 2007). Practitioners are largely in agreement with this; however, they advise a simple, practical approach that is complementary to existing guidance and can be adapted to specific contexts and planning processes. Specific suggestions included checklists, web-based platforms with worksheets, case studies that illustrate how climate shocks and stresses contribute to destabilization and learning briefs that demonstrate good practice in responding to these issues in an integrated approach. The need for training, capacity development and technical backstopping to support application of the guidance was stressed by a number of interviewees. This is particularly important to enable analysis of future scenarios for climate and conflict risks.

<sup>4</sup> The members of the consortium are: ActionAid, CAFOD/Caritas, CARE, ENCISS, International Alert, Peace and Community Action, Plan, Responding to Conflict, Saferworld, Save the Children, Sierra Leone Red Cross Society, Skillshare International, SLANGO, World Vision

## 5.0 CONCLUSIONS

Fragile states represent an extremely difficult context in which to work, let alone build resilience and adaptive capacity. Security concerns, weak governance and law enforcement, economic decline or stagnation, and corruption all contribute to an atmosphere that challenges both short- and long-term international engagement. And yet it is within this context that one finds the greatest need. In countries like South Sudan and Afghanistan, the social safety net provided by the state is minimal—if it is there at all. In these contexts, the population must largely rely on themselves and their communities to manage crises.

Climate change will not make this easier. By exacerbating existing sources of stress, climate change is likely to challenge the well-being of populations across many fragile states. In doing so, climate change could also exacerbate existing sources of tension and conflict, and contribute to fragility. Peacebuilding practitioners operating in these contexts must therefore design and implement their interventions to achieve both peacebuilding and climate resilience objectives.

Climate-resilient peacebuilding interventions take into consideration the implications of near- and long-term climate risk. In order to integrate climate considerations into the design and implementation of peacebuilding interventions, practitioners—during the research for this paper—noted that there was not a pressing need for a new, dedicated toolkit for integrating climate resilience into peacebuilding

interventions; there are simply too many existing resources already available. Instead, guidance on integrating climate resilience into existing peacebuilding resources is what is required.

To integrate climate resilience into peacebuilding interventions, practitioners should apply the following six broad principles:

1. **Use integrated context analysis as the foundation for planning.**
2. **Balance immediate and long-term priorities.**
3. **Address climate-natural resource-conflict linkages.**
4. **Facilitate coordination across disciplines, sectors and levels.**
5. **Adopt a forward-looking approach to planning.**
6. **Aim for resilience as an overarching objective.**

Integrating climate risks into peacebuilding interventions will not be easy; there are a number of general and climate-specific challenges to doing so, as listed above. However a failure to do so will threaten the long-term sustainability of any peacebuilding project or programme, and could even contribute to increased fragility and the emergence or re-emergence of conflict. By integrating climate resilience into peacebuilding in fragile states, practitioners will lay a much stronger foundation for sustainable peace and development.



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## ANNEX 1: INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE ON WORKING IN FRAGILE STATES

The need for peacebuilding approaches tailored specifically to the needs of fragile and conflict-affected states was formally acknowledged by the donor community, specifically the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration explicitly recognizes that donor principles of harmonization, alignment and managing for results need to be adapted for application in states with

weak ownership or capacity.<sup>5</sup> Following the Declaration, the OECD developed a set of 10 principles for its members to commit to when engaging with fragile states (see Box 1). These principles were put forward to ensure that donor interventions provide maximum benefit and minimize the potential for unintentional harm. They are also designed to support constructive engagement between national and international stakeholders.

### BOX 1: PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES AND SITUATIONS (OECD, 2007)

1. **Take context as the starting point** for the development of interventions, taking into account constraints on capacity, political will and legitimacy, dynamics of instability, institutional constraints and the appropriateness of engaging via the national government.
2. **Do no harm:** Ensure that programs are designed so as to maximize positive impacts and peacebuilding opportunities.
3. **Focus on state-building** as the central objective, to enable states to fulfill their core functions; international engagement should be concerted, sustained and focused on building a relationship between state and society based on legitimacy, accountability and transparency.
4. **Prioritize conflict prevention** by focusing on addressing the root causes of instability.
5. **Recognize the links between the political, security and development objectives** of fragile states and the potential for trade-offs between them in the short- and long-term.
6. **Promote non-discrimination** as a basis for inclusive and stable societies by consistently promoting gender equity, social inclusion and human rights.
7. **Align with local priorities** in different ways in different contexts, aligning assistance behind government strategies if there is political will and stability but a lack of capacity and, where this is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, consult with a range of national stakeholders and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level.
8. **Agree on practical coordination mechanisms** between international actors.
9. **Act fast...but stay engaged** long enough to give success a chance.
10. **Avoid pockets of exclusion** or “aid orphans.”

The OECD followed up the meeting in Paris with one in Accra, at which members signed on to the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), a further commitment to adapt aid policies to meet the specific needs of fragile states. Within this agenda, donors committed to actions such as conducting joint governance and capacity assessments, and establishing “flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities” (OECD, 2008, p. 19). Donors and developing countries also stated that they would work together to establish realistic objectives for peace- and statebuilding.

These commitments led to the development of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the “New Deal”) in 2011. Developed through the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), which involved the g7+ group of 20 fragile and conflict-affected states,<sup>6</sup> as well as development partners and international organizations, the New Deal was endorsed during the OECD’s Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, Korea. The New Deal is built around three pillars (IDPS, 2011):

<sup>5</sup> Within the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness donor countries also committed to harmonization of their activities, aligning programming as much as possible to strategies led by the central government, avoiding activities that undermine national institution building and using aid instruments appropriate to local context (OECD, 2008).

<sup>6</sup> Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Yemen.

- *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs)*, with five goals established to guide the identification of priorities of each country: Legitimate Politics, Security, Justice, Economic Foundations, and Revenue and Services.
- *Country-led and country-owned transitions* out of fragility through the establishment of one vision, one plan and a country compact to guide implementation of the plan.
- *More effective provision of aid and management of resources*, as articulated in a commitment to enhanced transparency of the use of aid; better assessment and management of risk for investments; use and strengthening of country systems; strengthening local and national individuals and institutions' capacities; and timely and predictable aid.

## ANNEX 2: SUMMARIES AND ENTRY POINTS FOR INTEGRATING CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES INTO GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

Name & organization	<i>Conflict Assessment Framework (2012) - United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</i>
Audience	USAID Missions and operating units, development partners
Summary description	The Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) provides a methodological approach for implementing a conflict assessment to help USAID Missions and operating units better evaluate the risks for armed conflict, the peace and security goals that are most important in a given country context, how existing development programs interact with these factors, how the programs may (inadvertently) be doing harm, and where and how development and humanitarian assistance can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict and to build peace. It outlines a two-step process for conflict assessment using the framework, with the first step focusing on diagnosis and the second on developing recommendations for responses in new or existing programming, with a goal of applying development resources in a conflict-sensitive manner.
Existing integration of climate change	Climate change and natural disasters are recognized in the framework document as an element of the context that may influence conflict dynamics. The guidance calls for analysis of contextual factors, how they will evolve over time, and how they interact with existing tensions, as a core element of the diagnosis step. It also identifies USAID's Global Climate Change program as a potential source of resources to address trends that may have a destabilizing effect on the country or region.
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	<p><b>Trajectory Analysis</b></p> <p>In the CAF, the assessment includes analysis of future trajectories, which they describe as broad scenarios that describe the potential pathways for the society under study. Development of these trajectories enables assessment of future changes in conflict dynamics, based on analysis of triggers (such as a natural disaster) and trends (such as climate change). This dimension of the diagnosis provides an important opportunity for analyzing current and future linkages between climate-related shocks and changes and the potential for conflicts to arise.</p> <p><b>Diagnostic Questions</b></p> <p>The CAF document includes an annex of questions to guide the diagnosis stage of the assessment. The questions touch on the role of climate change, as well as natural disasters, however they could go further in guiding assessment teams in making the links between conflict and natural resources, climate change and natural disasters. Further development of the questions in this area could be relatively straightforward and could make a significant difference in ensuring that resulting recommendations are climate-resilient.</p>
Website link	<a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf">http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf</a>

Name & organization	<i>Resource Management in Transition Settings (2013) – UN Development Group and Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (UNDG–ECHA)</i>
Audience	UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and UN Missions
Summary description	This guidance note aims to help UNCTs and UN Missions understand the negative and positive roles that natural resources can play in peace consolidation. It provides practical guidance to assist in thinking through how natural resource management (NRM) principles and practices can feed into transitional analysis and planning frameworks, including: Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), Peacebuilding Frameworks and Tools, the UN Common Country Analysis (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). While not relevant in every setting, the guidance offers diagnostic tools to assist those on the ground in deciding where and when such issues need to be addressed, how this can be done, what types of roles the UN can take on, and how the UN can support other actors.
Existing integration of climate change	Climate change is referenced in the first paragraph of the document, as an aggravating factor for increased pressure on natural resources such as a land and water. Climate-related issues are visible throughout the guidance, but not at a level that allows users to effectively address climate risks.
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	<p><b>Guiding Questions for Analyzing Natural Resources</b></p> <p>The document outlines a series of guiding questions for analyzing natural resources in transition settings. These questions explore the overall context in terms of dependence on natural resources, political economy linkages and governance systems and capacities. They also examine conflict drivers in relation to extractive industries, renewable resources and land. Within the guiding questions, there are a number of areas where a climate lens is relevant, notably in the area of renewable resources. The guidance acknowledges climate change as an influencing factor on availability of natural resources, however it does not adopt a future-oriented perspective that acknowledges potential changes based on climate change scenarios, except in the section on transboundary natural resource dynamics and pressures. It would be a relatively simple exercise to adjust or add guiding questions in order to more explicitly and comprehensively address climate change issues.</p> <p><b>Peacebuilding Framework</b></p> <p>The document maps the linkages between natural resources and the five dimensions of peacebuilding: basic safety and security; provision of basic services; restoring government functions; inclusive political processes; and economic revitalization, employment and livelihoods. A similar exercise could be conducted for climate change, elaborating the ways in which climate change may affect success in each of these domains (and, potentially, the ways action in these domains could support climate change adaptation). This would provide a helpful resource for understanding climate change and peacebuilding linkages, using a framework that many UN practitioners working in fragile states are familiar with.</p> <p><b>Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs)</b></p> <p>PCNAs are a key instrument guiding allocation of resources for recovery and development in fragile, post-conflict settings. The guidance document identifies entry points in PCNA processes for addressing natural resources, as both a sector in itself and as a cross-cutting issue. These include the pre-assessment and the assessment and analysis phases, where the role of natural resources in the conflict can be analyzed. Based on this analysis, priorities are identified, resources allocated and implementation and monitoring take place. The same entry points could be used for integration of climate change, ensuring that medium- and longer-term priorities take changing risks into account.</p>
Website link	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/UNDG-ECHA_NRM_guidance_Jan2013.pdf">http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/UNDG-ECHA_NRM_guidance_Jan2013.pdf</a>

Name & organization	<i>Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations (2013)</i> – United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
Audience	Managers and program staff of UNDP Country Offices, also UNDP advisors and partners
Summary description	The document is designed to provide practical guidance for facilitating UNDP's livelihoods and economic recovery programs. This includes a framework for livelihoods and economic recovery assessments, which inform program design. Based on the assessment, three different tracks for program interventions are recommended: A) livelihoods stabilization, B) local economic recovery and C) long-term employment creation and inclusive economic growth. The document goes into extensive detail on the process for developing UNDP programs and projects in each of these tracks.
Existing integration of climate change	Climate change is visible in the document, however there is a greater emphasis on natural disasters and less focus on future changes and scenarios. Sensitivity to disaster and climate risks is included as a guiding principle.
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	<p><b>Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Assessments</b></p> <p>The Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Assessment process uses a sustainable livelihoods framework to explore different dimensions of the household and community economy. This is complemented by a conflict and disaster risk assessment, which examines the major hazards affecting the population in question and analyzes how these hazards affect livelihoods and the local and national economy. Climate change is recognized as an influencing factor in analyzing these risks.</p> <p><b>Livelihoods Stabilization</b></p> <p>The guidance recommends three main strategies for livelihoods stabilization: emergency employment creation, targeted self-employment support and infrastructure rehabilitation. Each of these provides opportunities for integrating climate change adaptation. Support for emergency employment creation can be designed to address immediate needs to recover from crises, while building resilience to future shocks and stresses, including those associated with climate change. If informed by climate risk analysis, self-employment programs can support people to engage in livelihood activities that are more climate-resilient and enable improved risk management. Finally, rehabilitation of infrastructure can provide an important opportunity to include design measures to protect against climate extremes and changes.</p> <p><b>Local Economic Recovery</b></p> <p>Strategies in this track focus on medium- to long-term local economic recovery, including interventions to boost sustainable employment, income generation and reintegration, where appropriate. In order to be sustainable, and to not inadvertently increase the vulnerability of the local economy to climate change, climate risks should be considered in the design of the interventions. Recommended approaches such as vocational and skills training and business development services represent an opportunity to bring in climate risk management themes.</p>
Website link	<a href="http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/20130215_UNDP%20LER_guide.pdf">http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/20130215_UNDP%20LER_guide.pdf</a>

Name & organization	<i>Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict: Renewable Resources and Conflict (2012) – United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action</i>
Audience	UN Country Teams, UN Resident Coordinators, EU donors
Summary description	The Renewable Resources and Conflict Guidance Note forms part of a broader toolkit that also includes guidance on strengthening capacity for conflict-sensitive natural resource management and conflict linkages with land and extractive industries. The guidance focuses on drivers of conflict over renewable resources, recommending strategies to prevent conflicts and promote conflict sensitivity in development initiatives, especially those involving natural resource management. It provides a framework for analyzing conflicts over renewable natural resources, as well as specific interventions to address conflict drivers and recommendations for conflict prevention in specific resource sectors. Case studies are provided to illustrate the different approaches.
Existing integration of climate change	Climate change is well-integrated into the guidance document. It includes an overview of conflict issues in different sectors such as water, cropland and rangelands, forests and fisheries. This section also includes analysis of conflict linkages with climate change and natural hazards. Climate change also figures strongly in the analytical framework, where it is recognized as an external stress and threat multiplier on the availability of natural resources and existing vulnerabilities. Following from this analysis, support for climate change adaptation is explicitly identified as a means of reducing conflict over natural resources.
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	<p><b>Sustainable Livelihoods Approach</b></p> <p>The guidance suggests the use of the Sustainable Livelihoods framework<sup>7</sup> to understand how changes in availability of natural resources can impact livelihoods and lead to competition and to identify the social assets, coping mechanisms and institutions that are used to respond to shocks and resolve disputes. With this information, practitioners can identify appropriate interventions to respond. The Sustainable Livelihoods framework is also a useful way of understanding climate change impacts on livelihoods, so this presents an opportunity for integrated analysis.</p> <p><b>Increasing Livelihood Opportunities and Reducing Vulnerability to Resource Scarcity</b></p> <p>A key strategy identified for conflict prevention is to increase livelihood opportunities and reduce vulnerability to resource scarcity, for example through livelihood diversification, improvements in efficiency of resource-dependent livelihoods or preventing destruction of livelihood assets. If these actions are taken in a manner that takes climate risks into account, they may also reduce vulnerability to climate change impacts. Further, specific actions to adapt livelihoods to declines in resource availability from climate change and disasters are also recommended, demonstrating the potential benefits of adaptation in reducing resource-related conflicts.</p> <p><b>Increase Availability and Stop Degradation of Scarce Natural Resources</b></p> <p>Efforts to increase availability of resources and protect them from degradation may also provide opportunities for climate change adaptation, for example through actions such as rainwater harvesting or ensuring sustainable rates of use of renewable resources. These types of actions may also enable people to better withstand climate-related shocks and stresses that affect the quality and/or availability of resources.</p> <p><b>Early Warning, Risk Assessments and Scenario Analysis</b></p> <p>The guidance highlights the importance of early warnings, risks assessments and scenario analysis in order to identify conflict hotspots and enable effective preventive measures. The potential linkages with climate change adaptation in these processes are clearly identified, including climate risk assessments, multi-hazard early warning systems and scenario-based planning.</p> <p><b>Conflict Prevention Strategies for Resource Sectors</b></p> <p>In addition to the general recommendations described above, the guidance note includes strategies for preventing conflicts in different resource sectors, namely water, rangelands, forests and fisheries. For each sector, specific climate change adaptation actions are identified.</p>
Website link	<a href="http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/renewable-resources.shtml">http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/renewable-resources.shtml</a>

<sup>7</sup> For one donor's approach to the Sustainable Livelihoods framework and approach, please see: <http://www.ifad.org/sla/>.



Name & organization	<i>International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice (2012) and Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Cooperation: Policy Guidance (2009) – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</i>	
Audience	Donors and diplomats, multilateral organizations, policy-makers and civil society organizations working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.	Targets donors and their partners, but suggests that it will also be useful for policy-makers and practitioners working on poverty reduction programs and projects
Summary description	The objective is to improve international financial support in these contexts, making it more rapid, flexible and risk-tolerant. It argues for a mix of funding types, combining humanitarian and long-term development aid, delivered through a range of different instruments, in order to maintain peace, meet humanitarian needs and build resilient states and societies. The document provides recommendations for dealing with risks, based on a conceptual framework that brings together contextual risks (e.g. state failure, return to conflict, humanitarian crisis), programmatic risks (e.g. failure to achieve results, inadvertently causing harm) and institutional risks (e.g. security, reputational loss). It calls for improved assessment and management of risks, through improved risk communication and mitigation strategies, joint risk assessments by donors and partner governments, and sharing of risks among donors through improved coordination. An integrated approach to planning is proposed, bringing together actors from the development, diplomatic, humanitarian and security communities. Flexibility in planning is a priority in these contexts, with annual reviews allowing for the reassessment of progress and risks and adjustment to budgets, activities and delivery mechanisms to respond to emerging risks and opportunities.	The 2009 guidance on integrating adaptation into development policies and programs is focused on addressing the impacts of climate change on poverty reduction efforts, notably the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The document discusses integration at national, sectoral and project levels, as well as the local level, describing how to apply a climate lens” in decision making at each level. Strategic Environmental Assessments are identified as a useful entry point for consideration of climate risks; however, it is acknowledged that capacity to analyze climate risks is weak in many developing countries. Mechanisms for disaster risk reduction, including vulnerability assessments, risk mapping and contingency plans, are identified as a key support for integration of climate change adaptation. The integration process is expected to result in prioritization of both climate-resilient development activities and targeted adaptation actions, across different sectors and levels of intervention.
Existing integration of climate change	On the other hand, while climate change is not explicitly mentioned, the strong emphasis on risk in the post-conflict transition guidance provides an important entry point for consideration of climate change issues. Furthermore, the proposed approach to flexible funding and planning processes could enable adaptive management of peacebuilding and development processes, leading to better management of climate risks as one factor influencing the potential for a return to conflict, as well as the likelihood that development results can be sustained over time.	The climate change adaptation guidance is focused on longer-term planning processes such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and sectoral policies for relevant sectors such as water, agriculture and energy. As such, it may be less relevant for fragile states and countries in transition, which may be operating on shorter planning horizons and more flexible strategies such as Transitional Results Matrices (TRMs) or transition compacts.
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	Each of these policy documents emphasizes the importance of context analysis as a basis for decision making. Examples include the contextual risk analysis and post-conflict needs assessments in transition settings and the poverty diagnosis, which provides the background for PRSPs. In each case, a more integrated approach to analysis that recognizes risks associated with both conflict and climate change, now and into the future, would provide a better foundation for policies and interventions that are both conflict-sensitive and climate-resilient.	
Website link	2012: <a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4312041e.pdf?expires=1424210560&amp;id=id&amp;acname=guest&amp;checksum=D975FC91468EE607DA0857DEE8D9D71F">http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4312041e.pdf?expires=1424210560&amp;id=id&amp;acname=guest&amp;checksum=D975FC91468EE607DA0857DEE8D9D71F</a> 2009: <a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac/43652123.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/dac/43652123.pdf</a>	

Name & organization	<i>Water and Conflict Toolkit (2014) – USAID</i>
Audience	USAID staff, development partners
Summary description	The Water and Conflict Toolkit was developed to raise awareness about the linkages between water resource management, conflict and fragility and peacebuilding. It is one in a series of toolkits that support the integration of a conflict perspective in development programming. The Water and Conflict Toolkit is designed to be used alongside conflict assessments to ensure that they take water issues into account and, importantly, to design specific interventions that manage or prevent water-related conflicts, while also harnessing the power of collaboration around water resource management as a tool for peacebuilding and strengthening resilience.
Existing integration of climate change	Climate change is well-integrated in the Toolkit. It acknowledges the impacts of climate change and natural disasters on water availability, quality and access, and provides some practical recommendations for addressing these impacts.
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	<p><b>Program Options</b></p> <p>The Toolkit identifies a number of different options for climate-sensitive water programming, and several of these represent useful entry points for climate change adaptation, for example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Expand and improve less water-intensive rural livelihoods</li> <li>▪ Develop mechanisms for dialogue and shared resource management</li> <li>▪ Promote collaborative management of local infrastructure</li> <li>▪ Mitigate risk of conflict through improved early warning and response systems</li> </ul> <p><b>Rapid Appraisal Guide</b></p> <p>The Rapid Appraisal Guide provides a framework of guiding questions for identifying factors that could trigger or escalate conflict and to determine peacebuilding and resilience strengthening opportunities associated with water programs. Several of these questions address climate-related issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ How does current climate variability impact water resources?</li> <li>▪ What are the anticipated impacts of climate change on water resources?</li> <li>▪ Who will be impacted by this?</li> <li>▪ How are people, governance institutions and infrastructure responding to these changes?</li> <li>▪ How could they adapt better to reduce insecurity and risk of conflict?</li> </ul>
Website link	<a href="http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/WaterConflictToolkit.pdf">http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/WaterConflictToolkit.pdf</a>

Name & organization	<i>Guidance for Supporting State-Building in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: A Tool-Kit (2012) – The World Bank Group</i>
Audience	World Bank Country Teams
Summary description	The toolkit offers a conceptual framework to help country teams move from a narrow interpretation of state-building as building capacity, toward a more integrated view of state-building which also strengthens the state's authority and legitimacy—i.e., changing, over time, the way the state and citizens interact. The guidance document accompanies an e-tool, which provides country teams with a structured and guided process through which teams can collectively and systematically assess and record state-building needs in fragile states. The goal is to generate a common team-based experience of analysis, mobilizing and chronicling the team's knowledge about strengths and weaknesses of the state. It can help to raise many of the difficult state-building issues that are often under-analyzed. It goes beyond analysis to offer some suggestions for strategic and operational options for country teams, drawing on existing literature and experience with state-building in fragile states.
Existing integration of climate change	Climate change is not addressed in the Toolkit.
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	Because it is focused on state-building (vs. peacebuilding), the guidance is focused on strengthening the core functions of government: security, political and government, economic management and service delivery, with a focus on transforming institutions. In the Toolkit itself there is limited scope for integrating climate change, however the state-building process as outlined represents a precursor to the institutional strengthening, stakeholder engagement, planning and resource allocation required to enable climate change adaptation.
Website link	<a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-1343934891414/8787489-1347032641376/SBATGuidance.pdf">http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-1343934891414/8787489-1347032641376/SBATGuidance.pdf</a>

Name & organization	<i>Conflict-Sensitivity Resource Pack (2004) – The World Bank Group - The Conflict-Sensitivity Consortium</i>
Audience	Governments, donors and civil society (local and international) involved in development, humanitarian assistance and peace building
Summary description	The Resource Pack aims to provide an understanding of current practice, available frameworks and lessons learned in relation to conflict sensitivity. It is a broad umbrella capturing different approaches such as 'Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment' (PCIA) and 'Do No Harm', as well as less-known organic approaches developed by practitioners in the South. It presents broad recommendations on conflict-sensitive practice that organizations will need to further adapt in the light of their operating context, their needs, and their operational structures.
Existing integration of climate change	Climate change is not visible in the document. It describes a general approach to integrating conflict sensitivity in the project cycle and/or in sectoral approaches, which could be applied to any type of project (including a climate change adaptation project).
Entry points for integrating climate change into peacebuilding programming	<p><b>Conflict Analysis</b></p> <p>The resource pack provides guidance on conflict analysis to support integration of conflict sensitivity into development, humanitarian and peacebuilding interventions. The analysis studies the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of conflict, at different levels, linking to the needs assessment that typically informs project design. While the guidance on these different dimensions is relatively general, climate change issues could figure in the profile, which looks at emergent political, economic, ecological and social issues, as well as in the causes, or triggers, for conflict, which may include climate-related shocks such as drought.</p> <p><b>Contingency Planning</b></p> <p>As part of the conflict-sensitive planning process, the guidance emphasizes the importance of analyzing risk scenarios and developing contingency plans that define strategies for reacting to changes in context. As a similar approach is generally recommended for adaptation planning processes, this analysis could provide an entry point for introducing climate change scenarios and identifying actions to manage climate risks.</p>
Website link	<a href="http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/topic/topic/resource-pack">http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/topic/topic/resource-pack</a>

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